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THE VIABILITY OF DIRECT NEGLIGENCE
CLAIMS AGAINST MOTOR CARRIERS
IN THE FACE OF AN ADMISSION
OF RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR
Richard A. Mincer*
The reputation of a driver and his conduct at other times and places
are not reliable or safe criterions by which to determine what his
conduct was at a particular time and place. . . . A very poor or
careless driver may have been wholly free from fault in the particular
instance involved and, likewise, the most skilful driver, accustomed
to exercising the utmost care, may be grossly negligent on one
particular occasion.1
It is becoming increasingly difﬁcult to ﬁnd a case arising out of a commercial
motor vehicle accident where the driver’s employer is not also named as a party.
Typically, the motor carrier admits that the driver was acting in the scope of
employment, thereby subjecting itself to vicarious liability for the employee’s
negligence pursuant to the doctrine of respondeat superior.2 Nevertheless, plaintiffs

* Partner, Hirst Applegate, LLP; Cheyenne, WY. I want to express my thanks to Amanda
Good, an associate at Hirst Applegate, who provided valuable assistance in getting this project off
the ground and performed much of the initial research on this topic in the course of our work on
transportation cases, and special thanks to Jennifer Cook, a 2L law student at the University of
Wyoming, who surveyed the various states to provide an up-to-date “nose count” of majority and
minority jurisdictions.
1

Holberg v. McDonald, 289 N.W. 542, 543 (Neb. 1939) (quoted by Washita Valley Grain
Co. v. McElroy, 262 P.2d 133, 138 (Okla. 1953)).
2

Direct negligence claims also arise in a variety of factual situations including workplace
accidents, medical and other professional negligence cases, and any other situation where one party
may have had some duty to control the actions of the alleged wrongdoer. The majority of the case
law on the subject involves negligent entrustment of vehicles, although others will be discussed.
Therefore, while this article focuses on motor vehicle accidents, it is equally applicable to other
situations.
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often assert direct negligence claims against the motor carrier for negligent hiring,
training, supervision, retention, or entrustment. The motivation behind such an
attempt is to gain the plaintiff a tactical advantage in the litigation, to encourage
the court to admit otherwise inadmissible evidence, and to provide a basis for
oppressive discovery. The majority of courts hold that such direct negligence
claims are improper in the face of an admission of vicarious liability. They are
right.

I. THE STORY
If we view this situation in the context of an ordinary motor vehicle accident
(one that does not involve a tractor-trailer), we can see the wisdom in dismissing
direct negligence claims. As the story goes, Little Johnny was a problem child.
He went outside barefoot, tore the tags off mattresses and even ran with scissors
occasionally—despite his mother’s repeated warning that he would “put someone’s
eye out with that thing.” When he turned sixteen, his mom, Mrs. Jones, was
concerned about him starting to drive. But, as a single mother of three, she
needed help taking the younger kids to school, practice and other activities. She
also hoped Johnny would get a job to help out the family ﬁnances.

A. The First Lawsuit
As you might expect, Johnny got his fair share of tickets as a young driver.
He even had one accident where he rear-ended another vehicle.3 The day before
his seventeenth birthday, Johnny was involved in another accident in the school
parking lot with a vehicle driven by fellow student, Joe Blow. The other student
ﬁled suit seeking to recover property damages as a result of the accident. At trial,
Joe’s father, Dr. Blow, wanted to testify that the accident must have been Johnny’s
fault. After all, Joe was an honor student,4 had never been in an accident and
never even received a ticket for a trafﬁc violation. Johnny, everyone knew, could
not make the same claims; the accident must be his fault.
Much to the good doctor’s chagrin, Judge Learned excluded the evidence of
Johnny’s prior bad acts pursuant to Rules 403 and 404(b).5 So, the jury never
heard about Little Johnny’s frailties, his less than perfect driving record, or his
prior accident. The judge informed the parties that Johnny could only be held
liable if he acted negligently at the time of the accident and such negligence was a
proximate cause of the damages sought. The jury found in favor of Johnny.

3

Thankfully, no one was hurt.

4

If you have any doubts, just look at the bumper sticker on the back of the Blows’ minivan.

See FED. R. EVID. 403 and 404(b) for examples of rules that exclude unfairly prejudicial
evidence, character evidence, and evidence of other acts.
5
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B. The Second Lawsuit
Incredibly, Johnny was in another accident the next week on his way to a
job interview with Pizza Darn Quik (PDQ).6 Luckily, during the interview, the
manager did not ask Johnny why he was late for the interview and never checked
his driving record. Johnny got the job, as his mother had hoped, and went to work
as a delivery driver for PDQ. Dr. Blow was appalled. Never one to let a grudge
go, the good doctor ﬁled suit against PDQ for negligent hiring, training and
retention. He learned from the ﬁrst suit that a person has a duty to act reasonably
under the circumstances. Certainly, PDQ acted unreasonably when it hired a
person such as Johnny––never even bothering to check his driving record before
turning him loose on an unsuspecting public!
Judge Learned, of course, summarily dismissed the Blow claim. After all, while
PDQ may have acted unreasonably in hiring Johnny, this act had not translated
into any harm. Johnny had not driven negligently, had not caused any accidents,
and had not caused any damage to the Blows. Negligence, the judge explained,
has four elements—duty, breach, causation and damages—and the good doctor
simply could not prove all four. Case dismissed.

C. The Current Lawsuit
Now for the reason we’re all here. Johnny was involved in yet another accident.
Johnny was driving down a residential street in his PDQ Geo to make a delivery.
He was driving the speed limit and paying attention, for a change. Unexpectedly,
a man darted out into the street. Johnny slammed on his brakes and, just as his
car was coming to a stop a good 20 feet from the man, Joe Blow plowed into
Johnny from behind in his brand new Range Rover. The impact propelled Johnny
forward and into the man, who was severely injured.
Suit followed against Joe Blow,7 PDQ and Little Johnny. The injured plaintiff
alleged that the two young drivers acted negligently and caused the accident. The
plaintiff also alleged that PDQ was liable for their direct negligence. Speciﬁcally,
he alleged PDQ negligently hired, trained, supervised and entrusted the vehicle
to Johnny. Joe denied that he was negligent and blamed Johnny. Johnny denied
that he was negligent and alleged that the accident was caused by the plaintiff ’s
negligence in darting into the street and Blow’s negligence in rear ending Johnny
at a high rate of speed, causing him to be pushed into the pedestrian. PDQ
admitted that Johnny was acting in the course and scope of his employment,
admitted it was vicariously liable for Johnny’s negligence, if any, but denied that
it was directly negligent or that such direct negligence was the proximate cause of

6

This one was Johnny’s fault and his insurer paid $12,500 to settle the claim.

7

Joe was now 18 and the vehicle was titled in his name.
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the accident. PDQ ﬁled a motion to dismiss the direct negligence claims, arguing
that the claims were superﬂuous in light of the admission of respondeat superior.

D. The Direct Negligence Claims Should be Dismissed
Should the Court dismiss the direct negligence claims against PDQ, given the
admission that it is vicariously liable for Johnny’s negligence under the doctrine of
respondeat superior? The obvious and logical answer is yes and for a lot of reasons.

II. WHY THE DIRECT NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS SHOULD BE DISMISSED
A. What Is a Direct Negligence Claim?
Generally, a master is liable for the negligent acts of its employee when such
acts are performed in the course and scope of employment. This is the familiar
doctrine of respondeat superior. Yet, there are other theories that provide a basis to
hold a master liable for the negligence of its servant. For purposes of this article, the
term “direct negligence claims” means claims such as negligent hiring, negligent
training or supervision, negligent retention, and negligent entrustment.8 Also
known as independent negligence claims, these claims for relief were originally
intended to provide a potential means of recovery in situations where vicarious
liability is otherwise unavailable.9 In other words, liability can exist under these
theories when the proximate cause of the injury is an employee’s negligence who
is acting outside the course and scope of his employment.10 Simply put, these

8
Unlike negligent hiring, training, supervision and retention, negligent entrustment does
not necessarily arise out of the employment relationship, but is often asserted against a driver’s
employer. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 308 (1965).

§ 308 Permitting Improper Persons to Use Things or Engage in Activities
It is negligence to permit a third person to use a thing or to engage in an
activity which is under the control of the actor, if the actor knows or should know
that such person intends or is likely to use the thing or to conduct himself in the
activity in such a manner as to create an unreasonable risk of harm to others.
Id.
9

Plains Res. v. Gable, 682 P.2d 653, 662 (Kan. 1984). “The application of the theory of
independent negligence in hiring or retaining an employee becomes important in cases where the
act of the employee either was not, or may not have been, within the scope of his employment.” Id.
(quoting 53 AM. JUR. 2D Master & Servant § 422). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317 speaks
to situations where the master has a duty to control his servant “while acting outside the scope of
his employment.” Similarly, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 318 discusses a duty on the part of
a possessor of land or chattels with respect to someone using the same other than as a servant.
10
Plains Res., 682 P.2d at 662. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 317–19.
Generally, a person does not owe a duty to prevent a person from causing harm unless a special
relationship exists between the actor and the person causing the harm or between the actor and
the injured person which gives the injured person a right to protection. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 315.
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theories are intended to provide an alternate means of recovery against the master
for harm caused by his servant when respondeat superior or agency theories might
not sufﬁce. It seems apparent, then, that these theories are superﬂuous when the
master has already admitted responsibility for any judgment entered against the
servant.

B. Are Direct Negligence Claims Really Superﬂuous?
It is difﬁcult to imagine a case where an employer’s negligence in the hiring,
training, or supervising of his employee is truly the proximate cause of harm to
a third party in the absence of a wrongful act committed by the servant. In this
case, the action against PDQ rises and falls on whether Johnny was negligent
and whether his negligence was a proximate cause of the accident. If Johnny
acted reasonably under the circumstances, how can anyone ﬁnd fault with PDQ’s
conduct as his employer?11 More speciﬁcally, if Johnny acted reasonably, how can
any unreasonable conduct at a remote time and place possibly be the proximate
cause of the plaintiff ’s accident and injuries?
Put another way, if Johnny’s negligence was a proximate cause of the accident,
it really does not matter whether the direct negligence claims have merit or not. If
Johnny is negligent, whether or not the master is also negligent can neither increase
nor decrease the percentage of fault attributable to Johnny. Similarly, whether
or not the master is negligent can neither increase nor decrease the amount of
recoverable damages. Finally, whether or not the master is also negligent does not
change the legal fact that the master is liable for all of the negligence of its servant.
Since the direct negligence of the master is derivative of the negligence of the
servant, the direct negligence claims serve no real purpose, unless the purpose is
to inject prejudice into the proceedings and invite error.12

11

Similarly, a manufacturer cannot negligently manufacture a non-defective product, at least
for purposes of tort liability.
A manufacturer logically cannot be held liable for failing to exercise ordinary
care when producing a product that is not defective because: (1) if a product
is not unreasonably dangerous because of the way it was manufactured, it was
not negligent to manufacture it that way and (2) even if the manufacturer was
somehow negligent in the design or production of the product, that negligence
cannot have caused the plaintiff ’s injury because the negligence did not render the
product unreasonably dangerous.
Bradley v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 96-8073, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 15389, at *9–10 (10th Cir.
June 26, 1997) (quoting Garrett v. Hamilton Standard Controls, Inc., 850 F.2d 253, 257 (5th Cir.
1988)).
12

See, e.g., Beavis v. Campbell County Mem’l Hosp., 20 P.3d 508 (Wyo. 2001).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2010

5

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 10 [2010], No. 1, Art. 10

234

WYOMING LAW REVIEW

Vol. 10

C. What Harm Can Arise From Allowing the Direct Negligence Claims to
Survive?
If the claims are truly superﬂuous, why do plaintiffs ﬁle such claims and what
harm, aside from the obvious waste of time, can result from allowing these claims
to go to the jury? The answer should be obvious. Direct negligence claims against
the employer provide a plaintiff with a backdoor means to introduce evidence,
such as driving records and prior bad acts, which are otherwise inadmissible.
Moreover, such claims promote confusion of the issues, and provide an avenue
to encourage the jury to act based on passion and prejudice, rather than material
facts.
For example, Johnny’s driving record was inadmissible in the First Lawsuit.13
His driving record would be admissible, however, in the Current Lawsuit to
show that PDQ acted unreasonably in hiring Johnny to deliver pizzas. Johnny’s
character, obviously inadmissible in the First Lawsuit, becomes potentially
admissible in the Current Lawsuit. Similarly, PDQ’s business practices take center
stage in the Current Lawsuit, even though the critical inquiry is whether someone
operated a vehicle in a negligent manner thereby causing an accident. These issues
also provide a basis for unnecessary and costly discovery practices.

III. OVERVIEW OF THE LAW
There are several alternative methods whereby a master can be held liable for
the negligence of its servant. The most obvious is respondeat superior. Under this
agency doctrine, “a master is liable in certain cases for the wrongful acts of his
servant, and a principal for those of his agent.”14 The doctrine applies when the
servant is acting within the course and scope of his employment at the time the
injury occurs.15
Otherwise, “vicarious liability or imputed negligence has been recognized
under varying theories, including agency, negligent entrustment of a chattel to
an incompetent, conspiracy, the family purpose doctrine, joint enterprise, and
ownership liability statutes.”16 Regardless, all are different means to a common

13

See supra notes 3–5 and accompanying text.

14

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1311–12 (6th ed. 1990).

15

Id.

16

State ex rel. McHafﬁe v. Bunch (McHafﬁe), 891 S.W.2d 822, 826 (Mo. 1995). Note,
negligent entrustment does not necessarily impose vicarious liability on an entrustor who is not the
entrustee’s employer, parent, or principal. See, e.g., Ali v. Fisher, 145 S.W.3d 557 (Tenn. 2004).
Ali was injured in an accident with Fisher who was driving a car owned by his friend Scheve. The
jury found Fisher 80% at fault and Scheve 20% on a negligent entrustment theory. The trial court
then found Scheve vicariously liable on the negligent entrustment theory and ordered him to pay
all of the damages. The Tennessee Court of Appeals reversed and was afﬁrmed by the state supreme
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end—to hold one party liable for the negligence of another; and, in the context of
the employer-employee relationship. All theories share a common element—the
underlying negligence of the employee.17
In either case, the employee is responsible to the same degree as the employee
would be if there were no means to establish vicarious liability. Therefore, the
“liability of the employer is ﬁxed by the amount of liability of the employee.”18
“The employer is [liable] for all the fault attributed to the negligent employee, but
only the fault attributed to the negligent employee as compared to other parties to
the accident.”19 In other words, whether or not the employer is directly negligent
neither increases nor decreases the employer’s ultimate liability—nor should it.

A. Majority View
Not surprisingly, the majority of jurisdictions embrace the logically consistent
view described above.20 When an employer admits vicarious liability for an
employee’s negligence, a majority of courts hold it is improper to allow a plaintiff
court. Id. Speciﬁcally, the court held that negligent entrustment did not mandate a ﬁnding of
vicarious liability and that the relative fault of the two defendants must be allocated pursuant to the
comparative fault system. Notably, Scheve did not admit he was vicariously liable for Fisher’s actions
under any theory and this case did not involve an employer-employee or similar agency relationship.
17
Gant v. L.U. Transport, Inc., 770 N.E.2d 1155, 1160 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (“The doctrine
of respondeat superior and the doctrine of negligent entrustment are simply alternative theories
by which to impute an employee’s negligence to an employer. Under either theory, the liability of
the principal is dependent upon the negligence of the agent.”); see also Beavis v. Campbell County
Mem’l Hosp., 20 P.3d 508, 515 (Wyo. 2001) (holding that an element of a negligent hiring claim
is “some form of misconduct by the employee that caused damages to the plaintiff ”) (quoting
McHafﬁe, 891 S.W.2d at 826)). Thus, even if the defendant hospital was negligent in hiring the
nurse, “it is clear such negligence could not be the proximate cause of [plaintiff ’s] injuries unless the
predicate negligence of [the nurse] was ﬁrst found.” Beavis, 20 P.3d at 515. But see James v. Kelly
Trucking Co., 661 S.E.2d 329 (S.C. 2008); Ali v. Fisher, 145 S.W.3d 557 (Tenn. 2004).
18

Campa v. Gordon, No. 01C50441, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15032, at *1 (N.D. Ill. 2002)
(quoting Gant, 770 N.E.2d at 1160).
19

Gant, 770 N.E.2d at 1159.

20

Many state supreme courts have not speciﬁcally decided the issue of whether direct
negligence claims should be dismissed in the face of an admission of vicarious liability. Jurisdictions
in which the highest court followed the majority view include California, Connecticut, Idaho,
Maryland, Mississippi, and Missouri. See Armenta v. Churchill, 267 P.2d 303 (Cal. 1954); Prosser v.
Richman, 50 A.2d 85 (Conn. 1946); Wise v. Fiberglass Systems, Inc., 718 P.2d 1178, 1181 (Idaho
1986); Houlihan v. McCall, 78 A.2d 661, 665 (Md. 1951); Nehi Bottling Co. v. Jefferson, 84 So.
2d 684 (Miss. 1956); McHafﬁe, 891 S.W.2d at 826 (Mo. 1995). See also Debra E. Wax, Annotation,
Propriety of Allowing Persons Injured in Motor Vehicle Accident to Proceed Against Vehicle Owner Under
Theory of Negligent Entrustment Where Owner Admits Liability Under Another Theory of Recovery, 30
A.L.R. 4th 838 (1984).
Other jurisdictions that appear to be ﬁrmly in the majority include Florida, Georgia, Illinois,
New Mexico, Texas, and Wyoming. See Clooney v. Geeting, 352 So. 2d 1216, 1220 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1977); Bartja v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 463 S.E.2d 358, 361 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995); Gant,
770 N.E.2d at 1160; Ortiz v. N.M. State Police, 814 P.2d 17 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991); Rodgers v.
McFarland , 402 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Tex. App. 1966); Beavis, 20 P.3d 508.
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to also proceed against the employer on additional theories of imputed liability,
such as direct negligence claims.

1. Direct Negligence Claims Are Superﬂuous When Vicarious Liability
Is Admitted
The doctrine of respondeat superior and direct negligence theories “are simply
alternative theories by which to impute an employee’s negligence to an employer.
Under either theory, the liability of the principal is dependent on the negligence
of the agent.”21 Thus, in cases where claims for respondeat superior and direct
negligence against the employer are alleged, a defendant employer’s admission
of liability under respondeat superior establishes “the liability link” from the
negligence of the driver to the employer.22 Evidence of direct negligence claims is
rendered “unnecessary and irrelevant,” because vicarious liability under the theory
of respondeat superior makes the employer strictly liable for all fault attributed to
the negligent employee.23 The courts expressing the majority view recognized that
the dangers of allowing both respondeat superior and direct negligence claims to
proceed are many and risk reversible error.
Federal courts in Colorado, Washington D.C., Kentucky, New York, and Tennessee also suggest
these states will follow the majority rule. See Hill v. Western Door, Civil Case No. 04-cv-0332-REBCBC, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36641 (D. Colo. June 6, 2006); Hackett v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit
Auth., 736 F. Supp. 8, 10 (D.D.C. 1990); Oaks v. Wiley Sanders Truck Lines, Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 109111 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 10, 2008); Lee ex rel. Estate of Lee v. J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc., 308
F. Supp. 2d 310, 315 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Scroggins v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 98 F. Supp. 2d 928,
931 (E.D. Tenn. 2000).
States that purport to follow the minority rule include: Alabama, Kansas, Michigan, Ohio,
South Carolina, and Virginia. See Poplin v. Bestway Express, 286 F. Supp. 2d 1316 (M.D. Ala.
2003); Marquis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 961 P.2d 1213, 1225 (Kan. 1998); Perin v. Peuler
(Perin II), 130 N.W.2d 4, 8 (Mich. 1964); Clark v. Stewart, 185 N.E. 71, 73 (Ohio 1933); James v.
Kelly Trucking Co., 661 S.E.2d 329, 332 (S.C. 2008). Lower courts in Delaware, North Carolina
and Virginia also appear in the minority. Smith v. Williams, C.A. No. 05C-10-307 PLA, 2007 Del.
Super. LEXIS 266, at *16–17 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 11, 2007); Plummer v. Henry; 171 S.E.2d 330,
334 (N.C. Ct. App. 1969); Fairshter v. Am. Nat’l Red Cross, 322 F. Supp. 2d 646, 654 (E.D. Va.
2004).
21
Gant, 770 N.E.2d at 1160; accord Beavis, 20 P.3d at 514–17 (negligent hiring claim rests
upon the predicate of the employee’s alleged negligence); McHafﬁe, 891 S.W.2d 822 (ﬁnding
that, since the purpose of such direct negligence claims is to impose vicarious liability where none
otherwise exists, there is no need to submit such claims to the jury where vicarious liability is
admitted).
22

Bartja, 463 S.E.2d at 361.

23

Id. at 361 (“In cases alleging both respondeat superior and negligent entrustment against
an employer for the acts of its driver where no punitive damages are sought, we have stated that a
defendant employer’s admission of liability under respondeat superior establishes ‘the liability link
from the negligence of the driver . . . rendering proof of negligent entrustment unnecessary and
irrelevant.’” (quoting Thomason v. Harper, 289 S.E.2d 773 (1982)). “Thus, the evidence of [the
driver’s] prior driving record is ‘unnecessary and irrelevant . . . .’” Bartja, 463 S.E.2d at 817; see
also McHafﬁe, 891 S.W.2d at 826–27 (same); Gant, 770 N.E.2d at 1160 (holding that if vicarious
liability is not disputed, “there is no need to prove that the employer is liable”; the direct negligence
cause of action is “duplicative and unnecessary”).
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2. Direct Negligence Claims Confuse the Issues
The primary issues for a court to consider in a motor vehicle accident case are
whether a driver was negligent in the operation of his or her vehicle and whether
that negligence was a proximate cause of the plaintiff ’s injuries. The evidence
necessary to support direct negligence claims, such as a driver’s driving record,
or the employer’s hiring practices, is routinely excluded as evidence in a motor
vehicle accident case.24 This evidence is either irrelevant to a determination of
what happened in the accident or is unfairly prejudicial.25
“A very poor or careless driver may have been free from fault in the particular
instance involved and, likewise, the most skillful driver, accustomed to exercising
the utmost care may be grossly negligent on one particular occasion.”26 This basic
tenet of both tort and criminal law forms the basis for rules of evidence such as
Federal Rules of Evidence 401, 403 and 404(b). “[C]ollateral misconduct such
as other automobile accidents or arrests for violation of motor vehicle laws would
obscure the basic issue, namely, the negligence of the driver, and would inject
into the trial indirectly, that which would otherwise be irrelevant.”27 “A defendant
should be punished for the conduct that harmed the plaintiff, not for being an
unsavory individual or business.”28 Simply put,
to hold that the rights and liabilities of the parties should be
determined, not solely by what they did, but by their conduct
on other occasions and in different situations would put us on
a tortious trail—tedious, difﬁcult and expensive to follow and
leading in the end only to an intolerable result.29
Evidence of direct negligence risks the danger of the jury drawing inferences
from “prior bad acts.”30 Therefore, courts bar such superﬂuous claims because
“permitting proof of previous misconduct would only serve to inﬂame the jury
24

Even minority jurisdictions acknowledge that such evidence should be inadmissible. See,
e.g., Deatherage v. Dyer, 530 P.2d 150, 152 (Okla. Civ. App. 1974).
25

Order Granting Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 4, Wernke v.
Powder River Coal, L.L.C., Civ. No. 00132-D (D. Wyo. Feb. 20, 2009) (Wernke Order) (“The
reasons for limiting plaintiffs’ causes of action are many, including the risk that the proof of
previous misconduct necessary to show [direct negligence claims] might ‘inﬂame the jury.’”); see also
McHafﬁe, 891 S.W.2d at 826 (citing Wise, 718 P.2d at 1181–82; Willis, 159 S.E.2d at 158).
26

Deatherage, 530 P.2d at 152.

27

Gant, 770 N.E.2d at 1158 (quotation and citation omitted).

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003); see also FED. R. EVID.
404(b) (prior acts not admissible).
28

29

Deatherage, 530 P.2d at 152.

30

Hackett, 736 F. Supp. at 9 (invoking the “danger that the jury might draw the inadmissible
inference that because the [driver] had been negligent on other occasions he was negligent at the
time of the accident”) (citation omitted).
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and result in the ‘danger that the jury might draw the impermissible inference that
because the [driver] had been negligent on other occasions he was negligent at the
time of the accident.’”31

3. Direct Negligence Claims Invite a Jury to Improperly Assess the
Negligence of the Employer Twice
If a jury ﬁnds an employer negligent on the direct negligence claims, it is
likely that the jury will allocate a greater percentage of fault to the employer than
is attributable to the employee for his negligence, if any, in the accident. In other
words, if the employee is found to be forty percent at fault based on his driving,
the fact the employer was also negligent in its hiring practices cannot raise the
fault of the employee to ﬁfty or sixty percent in the accident—the driver’s conduct
in relation to that of other actors remains the same. Such an assessment would be
“plainly illogical.”32 “To allow both causes of action to stand would allow the jury
to assess or apportion the principal’s liability twice”33 and for no legally acceptable
reason.
To illustrate, we will again use Johnny’s situation. For example, a jury
determines that the plaintiff is thirty percent at fault for darting out in the road,
Little Johnny is twenty percent at fault for not maintaining a proper lookout, and
Joe Blow is ﬁfty percent at fault for rear-ending Johnny.
What if the judge allowed the jury to also consider PDQ’s alleged negligence
and the jury found PDQ failed to check Johnny’s driving record and failed to
provide any training? What difference does any of this possibly make with respect
to the apportionment of fault for the cause of the accident? The answer, quite
obviously, is none. But, will some juries be angry enough with PDQ (or confused
by the comparative fault jury instructions) to ﬁnd PDQ some percentage at fault?
If so, where does that fault come from—is the fault of Johnny, Blow, or Plaintiff
reduced? If so, why? Can PDQ’s negligence increase the amount of plaintiff ’s
compensatory damages? If PDQ is fault free does that mean the plaintiff ’s damages
are reduced? Of course not, the special and general damages are still the same. The
bottom line is, the jury assesses the fault of the employer as part of the vicarious
liability claim. Since the direct negligence claims are derivative of the employee’s
negligence, it is improper and unfair to assess the employer’s fault a second time
for the same occurrence.

31
Bowman, 832 F. Supp. at 1021, 1022 (citing Hackett, 736 F. Supp. at 9); see also Hackett,
736 F. Supp. at 9, 10 (citing, e.g., Breeding, 378 F.2d 171; Hood, 459 F. Supp. 684; Elrod, 628
S.W.2d 17; Title v. Johnson, 185 S.E.2d 627 (Ga. Ct. App. 1971); Plummer, 171 S.E.2d 330).
32
McHafﬁe, 891 S.W.2d at 826; see also Wernke Order, supra note 25, at 4. Obviously, this
result depends in large part on the jurisdiction’s comparative fault system.
33

Thompson v. Ne. Ill. Reg’l Commuter R.R., 854 N.E.2d 744, 747 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol10/iss1/10

10

Mincer: Viability of Direct Negligence Claims against Motor Carriers in t

DIRECT NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS

2010

239

According to the majority view, even if Plaintiff pursues direct negligence
claims, the employer’s liability is limited to those compensatory damages
proximately caused by the driver’s fault in the accident in question.34 Put another
way, the negligence of the plaintiff and third parties is neither enhanced nor
diminished by the employer’s direct negligence or lack thereof. We could instruct
juries to only assess fault for the negligence of the driver, but it makes more sense
to simply dismiss the claim.35
Another danger of proceeding with claims against the employer and
employee in the same action is that a jury could determine that the employer
acted negligently and then assess liability without determining that the driver
was, in fact, negligent and a proximate cause of the accident. If the jury ﬁnds the
employer negligent, but not the employee, the claim against the employer must
fail for a lack of proximate cause.36 Since direct negligence claims are “predicated
initially on, and therefore entirely derivative of, the negligence of the employee,”37
the employer’s overall liability cannot exceed the liability of the employee.38
Instead, the liability of the employer is ﬁxed by the amount of employee liability.39
When two or more persons may be vicariously liable for the negligence of
the defendant employee, it may be necessary to have a trial to determine which
party pays what. This situation arose in Beavis v. Campbell County Memorial
Hospital, which is discussed in more detail later. The Beavis court properly
bifurcated the direct negligence claims from the claims against the employee.40
Since the employee’s negligence must be established to satisfy the proximate cause
element of the direct negligence claims, it made sense to try the claims against the
employee ﬁrst. If the employee prevailed, there would be no need to determine
whether any other party was vicariously liable for the employee’s negligence. Of
course, if the plaintiff proved the employee’s negligence, a subsequent proceeding
would determine whether the employee’s negligence should be imputed to either
of the other parties, and, if so, in what percentages. The Beavis trial court wisely
realized that attempting to try all of these issues in one proceeding would likely
confuse the issues and may invite error; thus, bifurcation achieved justice.41

34

Gant, 770 N.E.2d at 1159.

35

If, for some reason, the claim remains viable, the direct negligence claims should be tried if
and only if the jury ﬁrst ﬁnds the employee at fault.
36
Browder v. Morris, 975 S.W.2d 308, 310 (Tenn. 1998) (“By deﬁnition, one who is
vicariously liable is not one who has ‘caused or contributed to’ another’s injuries.”). The causal
connection between the employer’s conduct and the injury is the act of the employee.
37

Gant, 770 N.E.2d at 1159 (discussing a negligent entrustment claim).

38

Id.

39

McHafﬁe, 891 S.W.2d at 826 (citing Helm v. Wismar, 820 S.W.2d 495, 497 (Mo. 1991)).

40

Beavis, 20 P.3d at 514–17.

41

See id. at 515.
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4. Evidence of Direct Negligence is Prejudicial to the Driver
Simply put, if evidence of direct negligence is admitted (e.g., a bad driving
record), then “the jury might draw the inadmissible inference that because the
[driver] had been negligent on other occasions, he was negligent at the time of
the accident.”42 All courts recognize that evidence such as a bad driving record or
prior bad acts are inadmissible because such evidence will prejudice the jury with
respect to the determination of the driver’s negligence.43
Seventy years ago, the Nebraska Supreme Court aptly explained the reason
behind excluding such evidence:
The reputation of a driver and his conduct at other times and
places are not reliable or safe criterions by which to determine
what his conduct was at a particular time and place.
Most automobile drivers operate their vehicles over many
thousands of miles without accident and in the presence of the
ever-present hazard of other trafﬁc, and yet we are appalled by
too many thousands of serious accidents. This situation justiﬁes
the conclusion that most motor vehicle accidents chargeable
to man-failure are due to lapses from the customary skill and
care of the drivers involved. A very poor or careless driver may
have been wholly free from fault in the particular instance
involved and, likewise, the most skilful driver, accustomed to
exercising the utmost care, may be grossly negligent on one
particular occasion. In either situation, to hold that the rights
and liabilities of the parties should be determined, not solely by
what they did, but by their conduct on other occasions and in
different situations would put us on a tortuous trail—tedious,
difﬁcult and expensive to follow, and leading in the end only to
intolerable injustice.44
The answer from the majority of jurisdictions is to dismiss the direct
negligence claims and not inject error into the proceedings.

42

Hackett, 736 F. Supp. at 9.

See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404(b) and similar state rules of evidence. “It is well settled that
evidence of other accidents is not admissible to show negligence. Behavior in a remote time and
place tells us nothing of the care exercised in the instant accident.” Deatherage, 530 P.2d at 152.
43

44
Holberg v. McDonald, 289 N.W. 542, 543 (Neb. 1939) (quoted by Washita Valley
Grain Co. v. McElroy, 262 P.2d 133, 138 (Okla. 1953)); see also Clooney, 352 So. 2d at 1220
(“Ordinarily, the evidence of a defendant’s past driving record should not be made a part of the jury’s
considerations.”).
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5. Direct Negligence Claims Waste Time and Resources
Finally, if all of the theories for attaching liability to one person for the
negligence of another were recognized and all pleaded in one case where the
vicarious liability is admitted, “the evidence laboriously submitted to establish
other theories serves no real purpose,” so “the energy and time of courts and
litigants is unnecessarily expended.”45 Obviously, time, money and energy spent
on discovery increases as does the trial time to present evidence of company
policies and industry standards with regard to hiring, training and supervision,
not to mention the possibility of several mini-trials to determine whether each
prior act was really bad or not.
Once vicarious liability for negligence is admitted under respondeat superior,
the employer (to whom negligence is imputed) becomes strictly liable to the
plaintiff for damages attributable to the conduct of the employee (the person
from whom negligence is imputed). This is true regardless of the “percentage of
fault” as between the person whose negligence directly caused the injury and the
one whose liability for negligence is derivative.46 Simply put, the direct negligence
claims are superﬂuous and there is no need for the court or the litigants to expend
the time, money and energy to pursue and defend against claims that will not (or
should not) affect the outcome. Since allowing these claims to go forward serves
no purpose other than to invite error, why take the chance?

B. Minority View
Some courts, nevertheless, permit a plaintiff to pursue a direct negligence
claim even when the defendant admits it is vicariously liable for the acts of the
wrongdoer. The depth of analysis made by these courts is typically very shallow and
rarely goes beyond the simple fact that direct negligence claims are independent
causes of action requiring proof of the employer’s negligence in a manner different
from that of the employee who was actually involved in the accident.
Other courts seize on snippets from other cases without giving any real
thought as to the practical effect of such a ruling. Other courts seem to simply
misunderstand the law or, worse, misquote the controlling law.47 Some of these
courts fail to closely evaluate the facts of a speciﬁc case before relying on such
facts to deny a motion to dismiss the direct negligence claims.48 Others essentially
hold that the admitted prejudice occurring from the admission of otherwise

45
McHafﬁe, 891 S.W.2d at 826; see also Rebstock v. Evans Prod. Eng’g Co., No. 4:08CV01348
ERW, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96884 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 20, 2009).
46

McHafﬁe, 891 S.W. 2d at 826.

47

See, e.g., James, 661 S.E.2d 329.

48

See, e.g., Poplin v. Bestway Express, 286 F. Supp. 2d 1316, 1319 (M.D. Ala. 2003).
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inadmissible evidence to support a direct negligence claim is justiﬁed because
of the nature of the conduct of the employer, parent, or entrustor.49 These bad
decisions then serve as the basis for other courts to perpetuate these and similar
errors without principled and complete analysis.50

1. Direct Negligence Claims Are Not Derivative of the Employee’s
Negligence
This is a common thread that runs through the minority position. Rarely,
however, does the court’s analysis go beyond this simple statement or does the court
explain how and why the claim is not derivative. Are these courts implying that an
employer can be held liable for negligent hiring even if the employee acted (drove)
appropriately at the time of the accident? If minority courts would complete the
analysis, presumably they would conclude that the only way negligent hiring can
be the proximate cause of an accident is if the employee is also negligent.

2. Unfair Prejudice is o.k.
For example, in Perin v. Peuler (Perin II), a slim majority reversed the trial
court’s denial of a motion to amend the pleadings to include a claim of negligent
entrustment.51 The Perin II court believed the resulting prejudice was warranted
based on the conduct of the parents. Perin was a passenger in an automobile
that collided with another vehicle owned by Peuler and driven by his son. Perin
claimed the son was negligent in his operation of the vehicle and that the father
was liable “solely on the basis of imputation of the driver’s negligence under the
ownership liability statute.”52 The father was included as a party since he was the
owner of the vehicle. Michigan law provided that an owner of a vehicle could
be held liable for negligently inﬂicted injuries by someone other than the owner
provided the owner had given his consent to the vehicle’s use and the operation of
the vehicle at the time of the accident was within such consent. Defendant–father
admitted that he was liable for his son’s negligence pursuant to Michigan’s owner
liability statute.53 In short, the father admitted vicarious liability.
At the pretrial conference, Plaintiff sought to amend her complaint to add a
claim for negligent entrustment. The admitted purpose of the amendment was
to enable Plaintiff to introduce evidence of the son’s driving record in an effort to

49

See, e.g., Perin II, 130 N.W.2d 4.

50

Poplin, 286 F. Supp. 2d at 1319 (discussed in more detail infra.)

51

Perin II, 130 N.W.2d 4.

52

Perin v. Peuler (Perin), 119 N.W.2d 552, 553 (Mich. 1963), overruled by Perin II, 130
N.W.2d 4.
53

MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.401 (2003).
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show action in conformity therewith.54 Such evidence was otherwise inadmissible
pursuant to a Michigan statute similar to Rule of Evidence 404(b).55 The trial
court denied the motion to amend, ﬁnding,
[i]t appears therefore, that the sole purpose of the proposed
amendment is only to bring in the driving record of defendantdriver and thereby inﬂuence the jury. Since the defendant has
admitted that the car was being driven with the knowledge and
consent of defendant-owner, the defendant-owner will be liable
if defendant-driver is negligent.56
In other words, since the purpose of a negligent entrustment claim is to hold
the entrustor liable for the negligence of the entrustee–driver, there is no need to
prove the claim when the owner has already admitted vicarious liability under an
alternative theory.
The Perin case was appealed to the Michigan Supreme Court, which reversed.
The Michigan Supreme Court then granted a request for re-hearing and then, on
its own motion, reheard the case again.57
The Perin II majority recognized a crucial factor often overlooked by other
minority courts; namely, there must be a causal connection between the entrustor’s
negligence and the accident in question, which derives from the negligence of the
driver.58 The Perin II majority correctly observed the entrustor’s liability “is in part
vicarious for it cannot arise unless the person entrusted with the automobile uses
it negligently; but, the primary basis for the owner’s liability is said to be his own
negligence in permitting its use by an incompetent or inexperienced person with
knowledge of the probable consequences.”59
The Perin II majority appeared to recognize the prejudicial effect that would
come from admitting evidence of trafﬁc convictions. Nevertheless, the Perin II
court ruled that not only was such evidence admissible, but the decision seemed to
54

Perin, 119 N.W.2d at 553–54.

See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404(b). Note that the legacy of the Perin decision had more to do
with a legislature’s power to enact a rule of evidence than whether the admission of such evidence
was proper in the face of an admission of vicarious liability.
55

56
Perin II, 130 N.W.2d at 19 (Kelly, J., dissenting). The trial court also noted that it typically
granted leave to amend, even at such a late date, provided the amendment did not prejudice the
rights of the defendant. This amendment obviously did not pass that test.
57

Id. at 13–14.

58

Id. at 8–9 (majority opinion). “It could not be sensibly contended, for instance, that the
entrusted driver, thus known to be unﬁt or incompetent, had started any chain of causation back to
the entrustor if such entrusted driver, in the operation of the entrusted car, had himself committed
no act or omission constituting actionable negligence.” Id. at 9.
59

Id. at 8.
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encourage its use in the hope that such evidence would, in fact, prejudice the jury
and skew the verdict. In effect, the Perin II majority wanted the jury to misuse the
evidence of the son’s prior bad acts to send a message to parents by allowing the
jury to render a verdict contrary to the evidence or to inﬂate the damages in a case
that did not include a claim for punitive damages. The following quotes from the
Perin II majority evidence this judicial sanction of improper use of inadmissible
evidence:
[T]his defendant parent should take stoically the bitters all like
parents neglectfully brew for themselves.60
****
The common-law rule of negligent entrustment is both time
tried and valuable, and we are not disposed to dilute its worth
on assigned ground that the sad proof of junior’s record of courtconviction and parental knowledge thereof will “prejudice the
entrustor and the entrustee before the jury.”61
****
It may, at very least, awaken some overindulgent parent to the
fact that, from the beginning in instances disclosed as at bar, his
personal, distinguished from vicarious, toes have been exposed
to the heavy boot-step of liability whether he is owner or lender
of the motor car that known-to-be unﬁt son or daughter has
driven to the casually actionable injury of another.62
****
Provided always the requisite proof is made . . . , such “prejudice”
is due solely to the negligence of those who decry it. That
kind of prejudice manufactures no judicial error, reversible or
otherwise.63
According to the Perin II majority, if the evidence causing the prejudice is due
solely to the negligence of the party opposing its admission, it becomes admissible.
Such evidence is admissible regardless of such “time-tried and valuable” Rules of
Evidence such as Rules 402, 403, 404, 802, etc. This is simply incredible!
60

Id. at 11.

61

Id. This suggests that a proper purpose of a compensatory award is to punish the entrustor.

62

Id. at 6. It is typically improper to argue in a trial for compensatory damages that the
jury should send a message to the defendant and those similarly situated; yet, this court not only
approved, but endorsed, such a result.
63

Id. at 11. Quite obviously, this position is inconsistent with the rules of evidence.
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It should come as no surprise that the Perin II majority misused various cases
in support of its indefensible position. As aptly noted by the Perin II dissent, the
three cases cited by the majority all involved instances where the owner had not
admitted liability under the applicable owner liability statute.64 Obviously, when
an owner (or an employer) does not admit vicarious liability in some form, the
plaintiff is certainly entitled to pursue his theory of imputed liability.65 Where,
however, vicarious liability is admitted under an alternate theory, there is no need
“for this [c]ourt to possibly prejudice the defendants’ rights to a fair hearing.”66
Rather, the vicarious liability part of the case “was completed at the termination
of the pleadings.”67 After all, the purpose of complaint and answer is to remove
from the trial those issues not disputed.68

3. The Comparative versus Contributory Fault Explanation
In Lorio v. Cartwright, an Illinois court also misused precedent in refusing to
dismiss direct negligence claims.69 Prior to Lorio, Illinois courts were squarely in
the majority with respect to the viability of a direct negligence claim in the face of
an admission of vicarious liability.
Issues relating to negligent entrustment become irrelevant when
the party so charged has admitted his responsibility for the
conduct of the negligent actor. The liability of the third party in
either case is predicated initially upon the negligent conduct of
the driver and absent the driver’s negligence the third party is not
liable. Permitting evidence of collateral misconduct such as other
automobile accidents or arrests for violation of motor vehicle
laws would obscure the basic issue, namely, the negligence of
the driver, and would inject into the trial indirectly, that which
would otherwise be irrelevant.70

64

Id. at 14. Certainly, if the employer defendant does not admit it is vicariously liable for
the conduct of its employee driver, then the majority “rule” is never triggered because respondeat
superior is still an issue.
65

“If they controvert by denial of ownership or consent and put a plaintiff to his proof, he
may prove his case of liability by any proof of the driver’s prior incompetence and his necessary
scienter thereof.” Id. at 20 (O’Hara, J., dissenting); see also Breeding, 378 F.2d 171.
66

Perin II, 130 N.W.2d at 15.

67

Id. at 15–16 (Kelly, J., dissenting).

68

Id. at 16.

69

Lorio v. Cartwright, 768 F. Supp. 658 (E.D. Ill. 1991).

70

Id. at 659 (quoting Neff, 268 N.E.2d at 575).
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The Lorio court, however, concluded that Neff and similar cases decided while
contributory fault was the law of Illinois,71 were inapplicable after the adoption
of comparative negligence. While the Lorio court acknowledged evidence of
negligent entrustment as “highly prejudicial,” the same would be admissible in a
comparative negligence case because it is necessary for the trier of fact to determine
percentages of fault for both the plaintiff and each defendant.72 The Lorio court
relied on an inapposite case, King v. Peteﬁsh, to support this reasoning.73
In King, the issue was whether the theory of negligent entrustment was
available to an entrustee in a claim for damages against the entrustor.74 In other
words, when the entrustor knows the entrustee is unﬁt, can the entrustee maintain
a claim for negligent entrustment? King relied on Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 390 for the proposition that the negligent entrustment theory also provides a
means of asserting liability for damages suffered by the entrustee.75 The defendant
argued that, historically, negligent entrustment was a theory only allowed in
Illinois when an injured third-party has sued the entrustor for damages. Therefore,
a negligent entrustment claim should not be permitted where the plaintiff is the
entrustee, especially when the entrustee’s negligence was the proximate cause of
the accident.76 Plaintiff asserted that even if the user was at fault, she was entitled
to a comparative negligence trial and the theory was therefore viable. Plaintiff
further argued that Comment c to § 390 was inapplicable in a comparative
negligence jurisdiction since the comment contemplates an outcome based on
contributory negligence.

71
Contributory negligence used to be the law of almost all states. This doctrine essentially
provided that if a plaintiff was at all negligent in causing his own injuries, with some exceptions,
he was barred from recovery. “A number of rationalizations have been advanced in the attempt to
justify the harshness of the ‘all-or-nothing’ bar. Among these: the plaintiff should be penalized for
his misconduct; the plaintiff should be deterred from injuring himself; and the plaintiff ’s negligence
supersedes the defendant’s so as to render defendant’s negligence no longer proximate.” McIntyre v.
Balentine, 833 S.W.2d 52, 54 (Tenn. 1992) (citing W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS § 65, at 452 (5th ed. 1984); J.W. Wade, W.K. Crawford, Jr. & J.L. Ryder, Comparative
Fault in Tennessee Tort Actions: Past, Present and Future, 41 TENN. L. REV. 423, 424 (1974)).
72

Lorio, 768 F. Supp. at 660.

73

King v. Peteﬁsh, 541 N.E.2d 847 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).

74

Id. at 847.

75

Section 390 provides for liability when an owner of a chattel allows an incompetent or
inexperienced person to use the chattel in a manner involving an unreasonable risk of harm to
himself or others even if the user may also be liable to third parties for negligence. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 390 cmt. c (1965). Comment c, however, contemplates that the contributory
fault of the user may bar recovery. Id. A detailed analysis of the providence of § 390 is beyond the
scope of this article; although, there seem to be sound reasons why the theory, if even viable, should
be limited in scope.
76

King, 541 N.E.2d at 847.
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In response to the defense’s assertion that negligent entrustment was
unavailable as a matter of law where the negligence of the entrustee was at least a
proximate cause of the accident, the King court held:
It is absurd to argue the entrustee’s negligence is the sole
proximate cause of a negligent entrustment plaintiff ’s injuries,
not only because such a suggestion runs counter to comparative
negligence law, but because it would always cut off the liability of
an entrustor to a third-party plaintiff. If the entrustor cannot be
considered a partial cause of the injury, a third-party plaintiff ’s
only remedy would be against the entrustee. Such a result would
frustrate the theory behind negligent entrustment actions, which
is to put the burden of the expense caused by the accident on the
owner who, unlike the driver, is expected to carry the necessary
insurance to cover such risks.77
Thus, the King court simply noted that the negligence of a plaintiff did not serve
to bar a case based on negligent entrustment. Notably, King did not involve a
situation where a plaintiff sought to impute the driver’s negligence to another
party based on a direct negligence theory.
Nevertheless, the Lorio court seized on the above quote to hold that direct
negligence claims must always go forward so the jury can compare the negligence
of the entrustor to that of the entrustee, which quite obviously, was not the issue
before the King court. The trial judge apparently never considered that the courts in
the majority were predominately comparative negligence states. Not surprisingly,
Illinois courts refused to follow the erroneous lead of Lorio, and subsequent
decisions moved Illinois back into the majority.78 Logically, “[t]he fault of the
employer for negligent entrustment, in a comparative negligence jurisdiction, is
still derived from the negligence of the employee, therefore, additional liability
cannot be imposed on the employer where the employer has already admitted it
is liable for 100 percent of the fault attributable to the negligent employee.”79

77

Lorio, 768 F. Supp. at 660 (quoting King, 541 N.E.2d 853). The King court quite obviously
was wrong. Nothing in § 390 or its comments suggests that the negligence of the entrustee cannot be
imputed to the entrustor. In fact, illustration 7 speciﬁcally discusses a situation where the entrustor
may be liable when the entrustees are also negligent. The only exception is when the third-party
plaintiff also knows the entrustee is incompetent. The Lorio court perpetuated this error in ﬁnding
direct negligence claims are not superﬂuous in comparative negligence states.
78

See, e.g., Gant, 770 N.E.2d 1155; Campa, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15032; Thompson, 854
N.E.2d 744; Rozhon v. GTL Truck Lines, No. 09 C 4755, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87868 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 24, 2009).
79

Campa, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15032, at *3–4 (citation omitted).
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At least the Lorio and Perin courts attempted to provide some rationale
behind their decisions. Other courts have simply found that because negligent
entrustment is a theory that requires negligence on the part of the employer, it
must be allowed to go forward.

4. The South Carolina Debacle
South Carolina has an especially checkered past in this regard. In Bowman
v. Norfolk Southern Railway, the defendant railroad admitted vicarious liability
for the engineer’s negligence and moved for summary judgment on the negligent
entrustment claim.80 The railroad argued the direct negligence claim was
superﬂuous in the face of an admission of vicarious liability on other grounds.
The United States District Court acknowledged that the South Carolina Supreme
Court had never addressed the issue, but held the South Carolina Supreme Court
would likely follow the majority rule and granted defendant’s motion for summary
judgment. Speciﬁcally, the trial court acknowledged, “Obviously, plaintiff ’s
motivation behind his negligent entrustment theory is to get the engineer’s prior
driving record into evidence. Such evidence would otherwise be inadmissible
under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), but would be admissible in a negligent
entrustment action to show notice on the part of the railroad company.”81 Since
the claim was superﬂuous and carried with it the very real danger that the jury
“might draw the impermissible inference that because the [driver] had been
negligent on other occasions he was negligent at the time of the accident,” the
trial court dismissed the direct negligence claims.82
Then, in Longshore v. Saber Security Services, Inc., the South Carolina Court
of Appeals disagreed.83 There, Longshore sued security guard Schafer and his
employer, Saber Security, for a gunshot wound Longshore received during
an event where Saber provided security services.84 In the ﬁrst count alleging
negligence on the part of Schafer and vicarious liability on the part of Saber,
the jury found Longshore and Schafer to each be ﬁfty percent at fault for the
shooting, but awarded zero damages.85 Likewise, the jury found in favor of the
defense on an assault and battery charge against both Schafer and Saber.86 Yet, on

80

832 F. Supp. at 1021.

81

Id.

82

Id. at 1021, 1022 (quoting Hackett v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 736 F. Supp. 8, 9
(D.D.C. 1990)).
83

619 S.E.2d 5, 9–10 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005)

84

Id. at 7.

85

Id. at 8.

86

Id.
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the direct negligence claims against Saber only, the jury found Saber 100 percent
at fault and found no comparative negligence on the part of Longshore.87 How
could Longshore be both negligent and fault-free for the same accident?
On appeal, the South Carolina Court of Appeals attempted to reconcile the
obviously inconsistent verdict.88 The Longshore court held that the jury could
have found the shooting was an act of negligence and was partially caused by
Longshore’s negligence.89 Since the act was negligent, the jury could have found
for the defense on the assault and battery claim because that claim requires an
intentional act.90 As to the direct negligence claims, the South Carolina Court of
Appeals “reasoned” that even though Longshore caused the shooting as between
Longshore and Schafer, the jury could have found that Saber’s negligence in
hiring, training, or supervising Schafer was the sole cause of the shooting as
between Longshore and Saber.91 The Longshore court made no attempt to explain
how a person could negligently cause an event in one breath and then not even be
negligent for the exact same event in the other.
Notably, the Longshore court skirted the issue of whether a required element
of direct negligence claims is that the employee ﬁrst commit an actionable tort.
Since the jury found Schafer was negligent and partially at fault, the court decided
it need not answer that speciﬁc question.92 Of course, the court needed to answer
this question, but could not do so and let the verdict stand.
In Becker v. Estes Express Lines, Inc., the issue arose again.93 Defendant moved
for summary judgment, relying in part on the majority of jurisdictions that hold
direct negligence claims should be dismissed when the defendant admits vicarious
liability.94 While the Becker trial court did not adopt the Longshore reconciliation
of the inconsistent verdict, it did cite Longshore for the proposition that “[n]either
current statutory law nor jurisprudence in this state has speciﬁcally required a
plaintiff, in an action against an employer for negligent hiring, training, and
supervision, to prove the employee committed an actionable tort.”95 In other
words, the Becker court removed the proximate cause element from direct
negligence claims.96
87

Id.

88

See id. at 9.

89

See id. at 10. Schafer argued that Longshore continued to advance towards him with a hand
behind his back even after Schafer ordered him to stop and put both hands in the air. Id. at 8.
90

See id. at 10–11.

91

Id. at 10.

92

Id. at 9.

93

No. 8:07-716-HMH, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20400, at *9, *10 (D.S.C. Mar. 13, 2008).

94

Id. at *8–9.

95

Id. at *10 (quoting Longshore, 619 S.E.2d at 9).

96

Id. at *10–11.
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The Becker court also acknowledged the majority position, citing McHafﬁe,
but noted that a few other states take the minority position.
These jurisdictions reason that liability under theories
of negligent entrustment, hiring, supervision, training, and
retention the employer’s liability is direct and not derivative.
These theories do not rest on the employer-employee
relationship, but rather involve the employer’s own negligence
in entrusting, hiring, supervising, training, or retaining an
employee with knowledge, either actual or constructive, that the
employee posed a risk of harm to others. Therefore, a plaintiff
must be allowed to proceed under both respondeat superior, a
theory of imputed liability, and negligent entrustment, hiring,
supervision, training, retention, theories of direct liability, when
the employer admits the agency of the alleged tortfeasor.97
To assert that negligent hiring, training, retention and supervision claims do
not rest on the employer-employee relationship is indefensible. Employers hire
employees, train employees, supervise employees and retain employees. If the
employee was never hired, there would be no claim for negligent hiring because
an employer-employee relationship was never established. If the employee was
terminated rather than retained, there would be no claim for negligent retention.
Obviously, an employer has no duty to train or supervise people who are not his
employees.
The Becker court essentially dispensed with the notion that direct negligence
claims are predicated on some wrongful act by the employee or the entrustee. In
short, Becker, like other minority courts, held that an employer can be held liable
for negligent hiring, training, supervision, or entrustment, even if the employee
is completely free from fault. If the Becker court had been presiding over the
Longshore matter, it would have upheld the verdict on the direct negligence
claims, even if Schafer was found not negligent. Even the Longshore court did not
go this far. Once a court acknowledges the basic fact that direct negligence claims
are derivative of the employee’s negligence, there is no logically consistent way
to deny a motion to dismiss direct negligence claims in the face of an admission
of vicarious liability. It seems obvious that the direct negligence of the employer
must manifest itself through the actions of the employee to satisfy the causation
element of a negligence claim.
At the same time Becker was pending, another United States District Court
in South Carolina certiﬁed the question to the South Carolina Supreme Court.98
James v. Kelly Trucking Co. was actually decided three days before Becker, but not
97

Id. at *9–10 (quoting Poplin, 286 F. Supp. 2d at 1319 (internal citations omitted)).

98

James, 661 S.E.2d at 329.
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cited therein. Interestingly, the James court did not analyze or even cite either
Longshore or Bowman.99
Instead, the James court relied on the overly simplistic notion that liability on
direct negligence theories “does not rest on the negligence of another, but on the
employer’s own negligence.”100 The James court purported to rely on Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 317, but misread, misunderstood or misinterpreted that
section. Section 317 provides:
§ 317 Duty of Master to Control Conduct of Servant
A master is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control
his servant while acting outside the scope of his employment as
to prevent him from intentionally harming others or from so
conducting himself as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily
harm to them, if
(a) the servant
(i) is upon the premises in possession of the master or
upon which the servant is privileged to enter only
as his servant, or
(ii) is using a chattel of the master, and
(b) the master
(i) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability
to control his servant, and
(ii) knows or should know of the necessity and
opportunity for exercising such control.101
By its plain language, this section only applies to situations where the employee
is acting outside the scope of his employment. The James court wrote that this
scope of employment limitation is only suggested in Comment a of § 317.102 This
is quite obviously wrong. The James court also ignored that § 317 speciﬁcally

99
See id. U.S. District Court Judge Anderson certiﬁed the question. Id. Judge Anderson just
happens to be the author of the Bowman decision. Bowman, 832 F. Supp 1014.
100

James, 661 S.E.2d at 331.

101

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317 (1965).

102

See James, 661 S.E.2d at 331 n.1.
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requires the employer to prevent the employee from intentionally harming
another or creating an unreasonable risk of bodily harm.103 Incredibly, the James
court read this section to dispense with the necessity of employee misconduct.104
Yet, employee misconduct is exactly what the employer must prevent. Simply put,
the James court sanctioned the notion that an employer can be held liable, even
when the employee does nothing wrong.
Presumably, these South Carolina courts do not really mean that employers
can be held liable when their employees acted reasonably. One can only imagine
that even these courts would be quick to afﬁrm Judge Learned’s summary
dismissal of Dr. Blow’s direct negligence action when there is no evidence that
Little Johnny did anything wrong or caused anyone any harm. Yet, due to shallow
and shortsighted analysis, direct negligence claims are currently viable in the face
of an admission of vicarious liability in South Carolina and other minority states.

5. An Alabama Atrocity
In Poplin v. Bestway Express, Poplin was injured in an accident with a Bestway
tractor-trailer driven by employee Billau.105 Bestway admitted Billau was acting
in the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident.106 Bestway
moved for partial summary judgment on the direct negligence claims.107 The
Poplin court ﬁrst acknowledged that Alabama recognized direct negligence claims,
but had not decided whether they survive an employer’s admission of respondeat
superior.108
The analysis deteriorated from there. First, the Poplin court acknowledged
the majority view.109 The Poplin court then cited “snippets” from minority
courts without giving much thought to the implications of the decisions. For
example, relying on Kansas law, the court found “these theories do not rest on
the employer-employee relationship, but rather involve the employer’s own
negligence in entrusting, hiring, supervising, training, or retaining an employee
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 317. As we all know, negligence is failing to act as a
reasonable person under the same or similar circumstances.
103

104

See James, 661 S.E.2d at 330, 331.

105

286 F. Supp. 2d at 1317.

106

Id. at 1317.

107

Id.

108

Id. at 1318.

109

Id. (“Many state courts and federal courts applying state law have held that it is improper
to allow a plaintiff to proceed under two theories of recovery once the corporation admits that the
alleged tortfeasor was its agent acting with the scope of his employment. . . . This position appears
to be the majority view.”) (citing Debra E. Wax, Annotation, Propriety of Allowing Person Injured In
Motor Vehicle Accident to Proceed Against Vehicle Owner Under Theory of Negligent Entrustment Where
Owner Admits Liability Under Another Theory of Recovery, 30 A.L.R. 4th 838 (1984)) (additional
citations omitted).
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with knowledge, either actual or constructive, that the employee posed a risk of
harm to others.”110 The Poplin court apparently never considered how a theory
resting on an employer’s hiring, training, supervision and retention of an employee
can logically be said not to arise out of the employment relationship. This is faulty
logic.
The Poplin court also cited the Alabama Supreme Court case of Bruck v. Jim
Walter Corp. for the proposition that “the tort of negligent entrustment ‘does
not arise out of the relationship between the parties but rather is an independent
tort resting upon the negligence of the entrustor in entrusting the vehicle to an
incompetent driver.’”111 Furthermore, according to the Poplin court, Bruck was
allowed to pursue direct claims against the employer in addition to its negligence
claims against the driver.112 As a result, the Poplin court denied Bestway’s motion.113
A principled reading of Bruck, however, fails to support Poplin’s position.
Bruck died in a collision with a Jim Walter truck driven by Reynolds.114 Initially,
he sued Reynolds and Jim Walter Corporation for Reynolds’s negligence.115
Plaintiff then added a claim for negligent entrustment against Jim Walter and
Reynolds’s employer TLI.116 The corporate defendants admitted Reynolds was
their agent at the time of the accident. On the ﬁrst day of trial, the Bruck trial
court granted a defense motion in limine to exclude evidence of Reynolds’s driving
record.117 At the close of the plaintiff ’s case in chief, the defendants moved for a
directed verdict on the negligent entrustment count.118 The trial court granted the
motion.119 The jury later returned a defense verdict and Bruck appealed.120
The Alabama Supreme Court acknowledged that negligent entrustment was
a viable cause of action in Alabama and that the plaintiff presented this action in
the form a valid, well-pleaded complaint consisting of two separate and distinct
counts. The court also was “keenly aware” that evidence of the driving record

110
Poplin, 286 F. Supp. 2d at 1319 (citing Kan. State Bank & Trust Co. v. Specialized Transp.
Servs., Inc., 819 P.2d 587, 589 (Kan. 1991)).
111

Id. at 1320.

112

Id.

113

Id.

114

Bruck v. Jim Walter Corp., 470 So. 2d 1141, 1142 (Ala. 1985).

115

Id.

116

Id. Reynolds was employed by TLI, Inc. which was hauling a load for Jim Walter
Transportation.
117

Id.

118

Id.

119

Id.

120

Id.
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might prejudice the jury against the driver.121 The Bruck court, relying on Alabama
precedent, followed the minority view that a plaintiff should be able to proceed
with direct negligence claims even when respondeat superior is admitted.122
Accordingly, the Alabama Supreme Court found the Bruck trial court committed
error when it granted the motion in limine.123
The corporate defendants, however, argued that any error was harmless since
the jury found in favor of the driver on the negligent operation of the vehicle
count.124 As such, “Reynolds’s conduct could not have been the proximate cause
of the decedent’s injuries, and any claim for negligent or wanton entrustment
could not be sustained.”125 The Bruck court agreed.126
Speciﬁcally, the Bruck court held that “an entrustor is not liable for injury
resulting from negligent entrustment of a vehicle to an incompetent driver unless
the injury is proximately caused by his legal culpability.”127 Typically, an element of
a negligent entrustment claim is the underlying negligence of the driver. The only
exception would be “in those rare instances where the entrustee’s incompetence
results from non-culpable inability to function as a driver (as in the case of a
minor under the age of legal accountability or a mental incompetent).”128 In
other words, direct negligence claims are derivative of the employee’s underlying
negligence.129
Why then did the Bruck court hold it was error to exclude admittedly
prejudicial evidence of Reynolds’s driving record when the direct negligence
claims were clearly superﬂuous? Obviously, the only result from admitting such
evidence would be to inject prejudice into the trial.
What would be the need of ordering separate trials in a case like Bruck? If the
jury found the driver at fault for negligent operation of the vehicle, the defendants
would have been responsible for all of the damages caused by that negligence. A
second trial, following a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, would be a monumental
waste of time and judicial resources. Undoubtedly, had the trial court admitted

121

Id. at 1144.

122

Id. at 1143.

123

Id. at 1145. The court acknowledged, however, that a trial court could order separate trials
to avoid prejudice, if necessary. Id.
124

Id.

125

Id.

126

Id.

127

Id. at 1145–46.

128

Id. at 1146.

129

Id.
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evidence of the driving record, and if the jury found in favor of the plaintiff, the
second trial on the direct negligence claims would never have occurred. That is,
unless there was a need to apportion fault between the two corporate defendants.130
If the Poplin court had thought this through, it would have realized that while
the Alabama Supreme Court may say it is in the minority, the underpinnings of
its holdings are identical to those cited by the majority. It would have also realized
that denying the motion for partial summary judgment served no real purpose
other than to inject prejudice into the trial.

C. Wyoming’s Treatment of the Issue
1. Beavis v. Campbell County Memorial Hospital
The Wyoming Supreme Court has not speciﬁcally decided this issue in the
context of a motor vehicle accident, but provided important guidance on the matter
in Beavis v. Campbell County Memorial Hospital.131 The Beavis court correctly held
that direct negligence clams are derivative of the employee’s negligence.132
In Beavis, plaintiffs asserted a medical malpractice claim against Campbell
County Memorial Hospital (CCMH), Dr. Horan, and nurse Deb Hazlett.133 The
claim alleged Hazlett negligently administered an allergy shot to Pamela Beavis.134
Plaintiffs claimed Dr. Horan negligently supervised and trained Hazlett.135
CCMH admitted Hazlett was its employee and that it was vicariously liable for
her negligence and that of Dr. Horan, if any.136 There were no claims of negligence
on the part of Dr. Horan for anything other than a failure to train and supervise
Hazlett.137

130

See, e.g., Beavis, 20 P.3d at 515.

131

20 P.3d at 515 (addressing the issue of negligent hiring). In Beavis, the Wyoming Supreme
Court cited to McHafﬁe as authority on a negligent hiring claim. Id. The Beavis court did not
address the issue of when such claims are irrelevant and prejudicial to the determination of a
negligence claim. Rather, another element of the negligent hiring claim cited in McHafﬁe, that a
negligent hiring claim rests upon the predicate of the employee’s alleged negligence, ended the need
for further analysis in Beavis. Id.
132
Id. at 515, 517. The Beavis court also afﬁrmed the trial court’s determination that evidence
of negligent training, which included unrelated errors by Hazlett, were inadmissible pursuant to
WYO. R. EVID. 403. Id. at 514.
133

Id. at 510.

134

Id.

135

Id.

136

Id. at 511.

137

Id. at 516.
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The district court bifurcated the trial, initially trying only the negligence case
against the nurse. “The issues at trial were limited to whether Hazlett had properly
performed the injection and what damages, if any, occurred as a result.”138 The
jury returned a verdict in nurse Hazlett’s favor and judgment was entered in favor
of all three defendants.139
On appeal, the Wyoming Supreme Court reasoned that even assuming the
doctor was negligent in his supervision or training of the nurse, or that CCMH
was negligent in hiring Hazlett, such negligence could not have been the proximate
cause of the plaintiff ’s injuries unless the jury ﬁrst determined that Hazlett was
negligent in administering the shot.140
The Beavis court afﬁrmed the judgment.141 The Wyoming Supreme Court
determined that the issue of negligence in administering the injection was separable
from the claims of negligent hiring, training and supervision.142 Likewise, it agreed
that the district court’s “bifurcation decision is consistent with the purposes of
Rule 42, to avoid prejudice by (omitting potentially unfairly prejudicial evidence
of Hazlett’s qualiﬁcations and training).”143
As a legal matter, the Beavises’ negligent hiring theory against
CCMH rests upon the predicate of Hazlett’s alleged negligence
. . . . Indeed, ‘one element of negligent hiring is some form
of misconduct by the employee that caused damages to the
plaintiff.’ . . . Thus, even assuming CCMH was negligent in the
manner the Beavises claim, i.e., breached some duty in hiring
Hazlett, it is clear such negligence could not be the proximate
cause of Pamela Beavis’ injuries unless the predicate negligence
of Hazlett was ﬁrst found.144
The Beavis court did not, however, dismiss the claims against Horan and
CCMH until the jury determined that Hazlett’s actions were not wrongful, or
in any manner negligent.145 Had the jury determined Hazlett acted wrongfully,
138

Id. at 511.

139

Id. Speciﬁcally, the judgment provided, “Plaintiffs’ claims against Mitchell Horan, M.D.
are dependent upon establishing negligence of Deb Hazlett. Having failed to establish negligence of
Deb Hazlett, judgment is entered in favor of co-defendant Mitchell Horan, M.D.”
140

Id. at 515, 516.

141

Id. at 515.

142

Id. (stating the claims were not “so interwoven” as to preclude a fair trial).

143

Id. (citation omitted); see also Christiansen v. Silﬁes, 667 A.2d 396, 399 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1995) (holding bifurcation of claim of negligence against driver from negligent entrustment claim
against employer is not an abuse of discretion).
144
Beavis, 20 P.3d at 515 (citations omitted). Even though Dr. Horan was not Hazlett’s
employer, the same reasoning applied to the claims for his alleged negligent supervision. Id. at 516.
145

See id. at 511.
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thereby satisfying the predicate for direct negligence claims, then the jury would
have had to apportion fault between CCMH and Horan.146 Since the jury
exonerated Hazlett, the claims against CCMH and Horan had to fail for lack of
proximate cause and the Wyoming Supreme Court afﬁrmed dismissal of those
claims following the jury verdict.147

2. DeWald v. State
Similarly, in DeWald v. State, the Wyoming Supreme Court determined that
direct negligence claims against an employer are derivative of the employee’s
negligence.148 In DeWald, two Wyoming Highway Patrolmen were pursuing a
motorist suspected of drunk driving.149 The motorist then collided with DeWald’s
vehicle at an intersection, killing Mr. DeWald.150 Ms. DeWald ﬁled suit, claiming
the patrolmen were at fault for her husband’s death by negligently failing to take
the necessary steps to prevent the accident.151 Ms. DeWald also claimed the State
of Wyoming negligently trained and supervised the patrolmen and failed to
establish and implement appropriate procedures for this type of situation.152
The defendants moved for summary judgment, claiming the patrolmen acted
reasonably and were, therefore, immune from suit.153 The DeWald court afﬁrmed
the trial court’s dismissal of the claims against the ofﬁcer based on qualiﬁed
immunity.154 With respect to the claims for direct negligence against the State of
Wyoming:
Having held the patrolmen not liable, we must also hold
that the appellee, State of Wyoming, cannot be held liable, the
reason being that if the conduct of the patrolmen did not amount
to negligence that caused the accident, then neither could their
training by the State nor could rules have been a cause of the
accident. Stated another way, it would have had to appear that,

146

Id. at 516–17.

147

Id. at 517.

148

719 P.2d 643, 652 (Wyo. 1986).

149

Id. at 645.

150

Id.

151

Id. at 645–46.

152

Id. at 646.

153

See id. at 646. The defendants claimed immunity pursuant to the Wyoming Governmental
Claims Act (WGCA) as well as common law qualiﬁed immunity. See id. at 646, 647. The DeWald
court held that the WGCA contained an express waiver of statutory immunity for the operation of
motor vehicles, but that the WGCA retained common law defenses. Id. at 647, 648.
154

Id. at 651–53.
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because of inadequate training or failure to follow departmental
rules, the ofﬁcers acted in a negligent manner and caused this
accident. We have held that did not occur.155
Simply put, even if the State of Wyoming was negligent with regard to the
training or supervision of the ofﬁcers and had failed to implement appropriate
rules, since the ofﬁcers acted reasonably under the circumstances, the State’s
negligence could not possibly be the proximate cause of the accident. As such, the
direct negligence claims were dismissed and summary judgment was afﬁrmed.156

3. Wernke v. Powder River Coal
In an unpublished opinion, the United States District Court for the District
of Wyoming also accepted the majority view, albeit for somewhat different––but
equally practical––reasons.157 In Wernke v. Powder River Coal, L.L.C., the plaintiff
claimed he was injured in a mining accident when a coal shovel allegedly struck
his haul truck during loading.158 Plaintiff alleged that the mine’s employee was
negligent and that the mine negligently failed to train its employee in the proper
operation of the shovel. The District Court dismissed the direct negligence claims
in light of the employer’s admission of respondeat superior liability.159
Recognizing that “[t]he logic of the majority view is readily apparent,”
the district court reasoned that direct negligence claims are dependent upon,
or even derivative of, the employee’s negligence.160 Thus, “Where a defendant
employer would already be entirely responsible for his employee’s actions through
respondeat superior liability, the additional negligence cause of action would be
needlessly duplicative.”161
Additionally, the Wernke court examined the issue against the backdrop of
Wyoming’s comparative fault system:
The [c]ourt notes with some concern that if separate negligence
claims against an employer are allowed in circumstances such as
those presented by this case, they may well become a common

155

Id. at 652.

156

Id. at 653.

157

Order Granting Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 9, Wernke v.
Powder River Coal, L.L.C., Civ. No. 00132-D (D. Wyo. Feb. 20, 2009) (Wernke Order).
158

Id. at 1–2.

159

Id. at 9.

160

Id. at 7 (citing Beavis, 20 P.3d at 515).

161

See id. at 4, 7 (“[T]he employer Defendant’s liability would be the same under either a
direct or vicarious cause of action.”) (citation omitted).
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litigation tactic utilized to overcome § 1-1-109’s ﬁfty percent
bar by piling on additional claims. If a plaintiff can simply allege
additional, independent negligence in an employer’s training or
hiring, he may succeed in convincing a jury that his own relative
fault is less than it actually is, thereby recovering where damages
would otherwise be precluded.162
Despite this holding, the Wernke court acknowledged that there may be
circumstances where an independent action against the employer is appropriate.
These circumstances could potentially include a claim for punitive damages
“where the plaintiff must overcome the additional hurdle of showing willful
and wanton misconduct bordering on the criminal in nature” or other unique
scenarios.163 While the potential exists for a viable claim in the face of an admission
of respondeat superior, this case did not present such a scenario. This is because
the defendant employer will be fully accountable to the plaintiff—less whatever
damages may have resulted from plaintiff ’s own negligence—via respondeat
superior.

D. Exceptions to the Majority View
Because the primary basis for dismissing direct negligence claims is that the
claims are superﬂuous in the face of an admission of vicarious liability, it stands to
reason that should a situation arise where the employer faces additional liability
beyond that imputed to it by virtue of the employee’s negligence, such claims
should not be dismissed.164 This reasoning is logically consistent, but appears to
be more theoretical than realistic.
There are three primary situations where majority courts have acknowledged
this broad exception. The ﬁrst, and the most sound of these exceptions, occurs
where the entrustment of a chattel was negligent, but the entrustee was not
independently negligent. Second, some courts have cited a situation where the
entrustor knows of a dangerous condition of the chattel, but fails to inform the
entrustee. Finally, the most often cited exception occurs when a claim for punitive
damages is initiated against the employer and is based on the employer’s own
conduct in hiring, training, supervising, or retaining the employee.

See id. at 7–8. See also WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-1-109 (2009) (indicating Wyoming’s
Comparative Fault Statute bars recovery where a plaintiff is more than ﬁfty percent at fault for the
accident).
162

163

Wernke Order, supra note 157, at 8.

164

See, e.g., McHafﬁe, 891 S.W.2d at 826 (citation omitted).
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1. Direct Negligence Claims Not Derivative of the Employee’s Negligence
Remain Viable
The ﬁrst two “exceptions” are not really exceptions at all, since these situations
are not derivative of the entrustee’s negligence. For example, if a parent gives a
loaded gun to a young child, who then shoots someone, it may be determined the
child was not negligent because of his age.165 In that case, there is no negligence
to impute to the parent. Rather, it is the direct negligence of the parent that was
the proximate cause of the accident. Similarly, in rare circumstances, a defendant
may be held liable when the driver is otherwise free from fault.166
In the above examples, since neither the child nor the driver was negligent,
there is no negligence to impute to the employer or parent. But, unlike the
DeWald case, there is still a causal link between the accident and the negligence
of the employer or parent. The majority rule is simply inapplicable. While the
above situations can arise in theory, courts should not allow baseless assertions
to subsume the majority rule. Rather, consistent with the standards of review
for motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim and for summary judgment,167
courts should determine whether such claims are actually supported by any facts.

2. The Punitive Damages Exception
On the other hand, even when a plaintiff claims the negligence of the employer
in hiring, training, supervising, retaining, or entrusting a chattel to an employee
was especially egregious, there is a still a break in the causal chain if the employee
was not negligent. Does it really matter whether the hiring practices were simply
negligent or incredibly outrageous if the employee drove reasonably at the time of
the accident? If the employee drove his vehicle in a reasonable manner at the time
of the accident, what the employer did at some remote time cannot possibly be
the proximate cause of the accident.168

165
See, e.g., Keller v. Kiedinger, 389 So. 2d 129, 133 (Ala. 1980) (“If, however, the person to
whom the chattel is supplied is one of a class which is legally recognized as so incompetent as to
prevent them from being responsible for their actions, the supplier may be liable for harm suffered
by him, as when a loaded gun is entrusted to a child of tender years.”).
166

See, e.g., Syah v. Johnson, 247 Cal. App. 2d 534, 538 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966). The employer
was held liable for an accident even though the driver was found free of fault. Id. Employer knew
driver was prone to dizzy spells and just blacked out in this case. Id. at 545. Since the driver was not
at fault, vicarious liability was not an issue. Id. at 538. Presumably, a vehicle owner may also be held
liable where the vehicle is defective, but the driver is unaware of the defect. See id. at 539 (citation
omitted).
167

See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), 56.

168

See, e.g., Rodgers v. McFarland, 402 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Tex. App. 1966) (“Even if the
owner’s negligence in permitting the driving were gross, it would not be actionable if the driver was
guilty of no negligence.”).
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a. Can the Conduct that Supports a Direct Negligence
Claim Ever Support a Punitive Damages Award?
Questions arise when the evidence suggests the employee may have been
negligent and the employer’s direct negligence was especially egregious. Punitive
damages are generally available “to punish the person doing the wrongful act and
to deter him, as well as others, from similar conduct in the future.”169 Typically,
to support an award of punitive damages, the defendant’s conduct must be willful
and wanton (that is, outrageous), evidence an evil intent or motive, or show a
conscious disregard for the safety of others.170 Importantly, punitive damages can
only be awarded for the misconduct that actually caused the harm.171 Realistically,
it appears that it would be a very rare case where an employer’s misconduct in
hiring, training, retaining, or supervising its employees or in entrusting a vehicle
to an employee is so egregious that the conduct could support a punitive damages
award.
The reason such a situation is unlikely to occur is because it requires,
practically speaking, the employer to show a conscious disregard for its own self
interest. In motor vehicle accident cases, the result of this “outrageous” conduct
is a motor vehicle accident. Obviously, motor vehicle accidents, in addition to
potentially harming people, also damage property, often including the expensive
tractor-trailer units owned by the motor carrier. Accidents also often cause damage
to the goods being hauled by the motor carrier or cause delays in the delivery of
the goods, which can result in a breach of the shipping contract. Loss of a tractor
or trailer can also result in lost business income, because the unit is not available
to generate income for the motor carrier. Even when there are no personal injuries
arising out of an accident, the motor carrier is almost assuredly going to suffer
some loss in the form of repairs to the vehicle, damage claims by shippers, and lost
income for the time the equipment is out of service.
It is simply counterintuitive to assert that a motor carrier is going to willfully
and wantonly send an untrained driver out on the road in expensive equipment if
the motor carrier believes there is a high likelihood that the driver will be involved
in an accident. Unless a motor carrier acted with conscious disregard of its own
rights, it cannot be said it acted the same with respect to the rights of others. At
least with respect to cases arising out of motor vehicle accidents, it seems that
direct negligence typically will not support a punitive damages award.

169

Smith v. Williams, No. 05C-10-307, 2007 Del. Super. LEXIS 266, at *7 (Del. Super. Ct.
June 22, 2007) (citation omitted); see also Danculovich v. Brown, 593 P.2d 187, 191 (Wyo. 1979).
170

Smith, 2007 Del. Super. LEXIS 266, at *7; Danculovich, 593 P.2d at 191.

171

See Smith, 2007 Del. Super. LEXIS 266, at *8; Danculovich, 593 P.2d at 189 (discussing
exemplary damages in context of wrongful death action).
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With respect to commercial motor vehicles, these employers and their drivers
are subject to federal regulations. The Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations
(FMCSR) provide the framework specifying driver qualiﬁcation and training
requirements.172 The FMCSR speciﬁes when a driver must be disqualiﬁed from
driving.173 The FMCSR also provides license standards, requirements and penalties
that must be followed by the states in issuing and regulating commercial driver
licenses.174 In short, if a truck driver has obtained a CDL and is not disqualiﬁed
from driving, any negligence on the part of his employer with respect to hiring,
training, and retention simply cannot be viewed as so egregious as to warrant the
imposition of punitive damages, because the employer has complied with federal
regulations.175
Moreover, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA)
inspects motor carrier operations for compliance with the regulations.176
Speciﬁcally, the FMCSR contains procedures for the FMCSA “to determine the
safety ﬁtness of motor carriers, to assign safety ratings, to direct motor carriers to
take remedial measures when required, and to prohibit motor carriers receiving a
safety rating of ‘unsatisfactory’ from operating a CMV.”177 The FMCSA conducts
on-site inspections of motor carriers as well as inspections of vehicles and drivers
at weigh stations and ports of entry across the country. Motor carriers, especially
smaller outﬁts, might make missteps while trying to operate in a heavily regulated
industry, but these missteps are negligence at most.178 If the FMCSA has not
disqualiﬁed a motor carrier from operating CMVs, then the manner in which
the motor carrier runs its business was not so egregious as to warrant punitive
damages.
172

49 C.F.R. § 391.1(a) (2009).

173

§ 391.15(a)–(d).

174

§§ 383.1, 384. “The purpose of this part is to help reduce or prevent truck and bus
accidents, fatalities, and injuries by requiring drivers to have a single commercial motor vehicle
driver’s license and by disqualifying drivers who operate commercial motor vehicles in an unsafe
manner.” § 383.1(a).
175
See, e.g., Smith, 2007 Del. Super. LEXIS 266, at *13–14. The court conducted a thorough
analysis of the evidence presented for and against punitive damages and concluded punitives were
not warranted against the defendant motor carrier. Id. at *14. This analysis included that Williams
was a licensed driver, passed his physical, and was certiﬁed to drive. Id. at *13–14.
176

49 C.F.R. § 385.1 et seq.

177

§ 385.1(a).

178

Even this negligence, however, cannot serve as a basis of liability in the absence of driver
negligence that caused the accident. For example, if the motor carrier negligently failed to verify the
driver’s medical certiﬁcate, it does not mean the driver was medically unﬁt to drive. Similarly, even if
the driver has an expired medical certiﬁcate, it does not mean he actually has a disqualifying medical
condition. Even if the driver is medically unﬁt to drive, it does not mean this condition manifested
at the time of the accident. Finally, even if the condition manifested at the time of the accident, it
does not mean it caused him to drive negligently. Maybe he was rear-ended by another vehicle and
was totally fault free as to the cause of he accident. If the driver was fault free, the rest is irrelevant
for purposes of a tort action.
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The FMCSA is staffed by professionals who are given the authority to
disqualify both drivers and motor carriers for especially egregious conduct.
Certainly, the FMCSA is better qualiﬁed and equipped to determine whether
the hiring, training, retention and supervision of a driver is so egregious as to
merit penalty, than is a jury typically hearing a case in an emotionally charged
environment, on a body evidence quite properly limited by the rules of evidence,
and often with a pre-determined bias against big trucks. If a driver or motor
carrier has not been disqualiﬁed by the FMCSA, then punitive damages simply
are not warranted except in the most unusual circumstances.

b. Artful Pleading Should Not Subsume the Rule
As discussed above, it seems the “punitive damages” exception cited by
some majority courts is more theoretical than practical. Nevertheless, even the
theoretical deserves a court’s attention to determine whether or not the plaintiff ’s
punitive damages claim is viable or should also be dismissed. Just as it is dangerous
to have a hard and fast rule that all direct negligence claims should be dismissed
in the face of an admission of vicarious liability, it is equally dangerous to adhere
to an inﬂexible rule that when a plaintiff asserts a claim for punitive damages, the
direct negligence claims must necessarily survive summary dismissal.
To the contrary, for the very reasons that majority courts dismiss direct
negligence claims in the ﬁrst place, these courts should make sure to closely
scrutinize punitive damage claims so that artful pleading does not subsume the
rule. Plaintiffs should not be able to inject prejudicial evidence into a proceeding
simply by adding a paragraph to a Complaint.179

E. How to Handle These Claims at Trial
As described above, there is rarely good reason to allow direct negligence
claims to go forward when vicarious liability has been admitted under a different
theory. The one valid exception is when direct negligence claims can impose
liability beyond that of the employee and such claims are supported by competent
evidence. If the Plaintiff presents facts that support a claim for punitive damages—
or to support the rare case where the employer may be held liable in the absence of
employee negligence—then the case should be bifurcated to ensure the defendant
receives a fair trial on the underlying negligence claim against the driver. If––and

179

See James, 661 S.E.2d at 332. The defendant proposed that the court adopt the majority
rule with the punitive damages exception. Id. at 331. The court declined the invitation and noted
the futility of a hard and fast exception for punitive damages. Id. “As requests for punitive damages
are commonplace in cases of this type, we think traveling the road the [defendant] proposes would
create an exception which swallows the rule.” Id.; see also Wernke Order, supra notes 157– 63 and
accompanying text.
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only if––the driver is found negligent should the trial proceed to the second phase
where the plaintiff is given a fair opportunity to present the claim for punitive
damages.
In such cases, the only means to prevent substantial prejudice on the primary
negligence claim is to bifurcate the proceedings and try the driver negligence
claims ﬁrst.180 This is necessary because even when the direct negligence claims
may impose additional liability on the employer, the direct negligence claims are
almost always derivative. Absent this necessary element, judgment as a matter of
law is proper on the direct negligence claims.
Although bifurcated trials may pose an additional demand on our busy trial
courts, “[e]fﬁciency cannot be permitted to prevail at the expense of justice.”181
Moreover, bifurcation will actually save time and avoid unnecessary prejudice in
cases where the employee was not at fault. Jury instructions, while often touted
as a means to allow both types of claims to go forward, cannot protect against the
substantial prejudice to the employee driver.182

IV. LOGICAL CONCLUSION
Upon a review of the various perspectives, the logical conclusion appears to
be consistent with that of the majority—when an employer admits it is vicariously
liable for its employee’s negligence, claims of negligent hiring, supervision,
training, retention, and entrustment should be dismissed in virtually every case.
The reasons are apparent: (1) evidence needed to prove a direct negligence claim is
inadmissible with respect to the negligence of the employee, regardless of whether
the employee is a named party or not; (2) allowing the direct negligence claim to
survive adds nothing, other than prejudice, to the trial; (3) neither the percentage
of fault nor the amount of damages can be increased or decreased based on the
ultimate ﬁnding on the direct negligence claims.

180
See Martin v. Minnard, 862 P.2d 1014, 1016 (Colo. App. 1993) (“An abuse of discretion
occurs where the court’s failure to order separate proceedings virtually assures prejudice to a party.”)
(citation omitted); Christiansen, 667 A.2d at 399 n.3 (determining that bifurcating the liability
phase of a trial so that the jury would hear the case against the defendant driver independently
from that against the tractor-trailer owner and lessee was a proper exercise of discretion). The court
reasoned, “The critical factor, however, is that the prejudicial negligent entrustment evidence be
kept separate from the initial determination of the driver-defendant’s negligence.” Id.; Angelo
v. Armstrong World Indus., 11 F.3d 957, 964 (10th Cir. 1993) (“Bifurcation is not an abuse of
discretion if such interests [as convenience, avoiding prejudice, expedition, and economy] favor
separation of issues and the issues are clearly separable.”) (citation omitted).
181

State v. McCraine, 588 S.E. 2d 177, 205 (W. Va. 2003) (citation omitted).

182

See, e.g., Martin, 862 P.2d at 1016 (indicating that even with a curative limiting instruction,
the jury could improperly use the evidence to show a propensity of negligent driving).
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Importantly, there is no mechanical rule that a court can or should apply in
lieu of factual analysis. There may be some causes of action where the defendant
truly faces liability beyond respondeat superior. The court must then assess the
practical outcome of the claims before dismissing the direct negligence claims.
There may be a rare situation where the employer’s actions in hiring, training,
supervising, or retaining an employee may give rise to punitive damages. It is hard
to imagine what such a case looks like, especially in a motor vehicle case, but if
it occurs, then the case should be bifurcated. If the jury ﬁnds the driver at fault,
then the jury can assess whether the direct claims are so egregious as to warrant
punitive damages. But ﬁrst, the court should carefully review the allegations
and the evidence supported in summary judgment proceedings to make sure a
punitive damages claim actually states a cause of action and is not merely a case of
artful pleading.183
If a court allows direct negligence claims to go to the jury in the face of
an admission of vicarious liability, it should always bifurcate the trial, as did
the Beavis court. Knowing that evidence to support a direct negligence claim is
routinely excluded when the employer is not a party should be sufﬁcient basis to
bifurcate every such case. Bifurcation will often save time in the end. The ﬁrst
phase of the trial should focus on only the accident. The number of witnesses and
the scope of the subject matter will be greatly reduced since there will be no need
to receive evidence related to hiring practices, other acts of either the employer or
the employee, or what is necessary to reasonably train the employee. Obviously,
the results at trial will often alleviate the need for the second proceeding.
At the end of the day, this is ﬁrst and foremost a fairness issue that is not
susceptible to mechanical determinations. If courts will avoid the mechanical
application of any position, whether majority or minority, apply a reasoned and
complete analysis of the practical effects of the decision, and decide each case on
its relative merits, the rights of all litigants to a fair trial will be preserved.

183
It is also a determination that should be given careful scrutiny even at the motion to dismiss
stage where all well-pled factual allegations are taken as true. Courts that routinely deny all 12(b)
(6) motions should appreciate that such a decision costs all parties a substantial amount of time and
money during the discovery phase. While a plaintiff ’s hurdle to survive a 12(b)(6) motion may not
be all that high, courts should faithfully apply the standard of review for these motions.
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